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Introduction 
 
Over the last decade or so, the EU's external policies - now officially and 
rather inelegantly called "external action" - have grown in ambition, scope and 
stature.  The trajectory is neither unproblematic nor linear.  It is clear that 
some external policies work better than others, and that the EU's 
constitutional ambition, as expressed in the Treaties, is difficult to realize.  The 
overall tendency is clear, though.  The EU - which when it comes to external 
policies is best understood as a conglomerate of the EU institutions and the 
Member States - seeks to become an ever more significant global actor, 1 not 
just in the economic field but across and beyond the range of its internal 
competences and policies.  Indeed, the fledgling Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) cannot be equated to the external projection of an 
internal policy; nor is that the case for the EU's external human rights policy. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty was a scarcely veiled attempt to further constitutionalize 
the founding Treaties.  As regards external action, that Treaty clearly 
constitutes the apex of the EU's constitutional and policy ambition - utopian at 
best, in the eyes of most. 2  It is worth recalling here the mere Treaty 
summary, in Article 3(5) TEU, of what the EU hopes to achieve in the wider 
world (the full version is in Article 21 TEU): 
 
 In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote 
 its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It 
 shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the 
 Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, 
                                                            
∗ Faculty of Laws, University College London.  This paper is to appear in a collection edited by 
Prof Markus Krajewski. 
1 G de Burca, "EU External Relations: The Governance Mode of Foreign Policy", in B Van 
Vooren, S Blockmans and J Wouters (eds), The EU's Role in Global Governance - The Legal 
Dimension (OUP 2013) 39, 43. 
2 Or perhaps EUtopian, cf K Nicolaïdis and R Howse, " 'This is my EUtopia ...': Narrative as 
Power" (2002) 40 JCMS 767. 
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 eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular 
 the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the 
 development of international law, including respect for the principles of 
 the United Nations Charter. 
 
It is easy to denigrate such utopian ambition.  Yet this is a fundamental Treaty 
provision, and it is cast in mandatory terms: the EU shall uphold and promote 
its values and interests.  This paper seeks to inquire into the meaning of this 
Treaty obligation, in particular as regards some of the values generally 
underpinning the EU's internal market, and the rules and principles 
concerning services of general interest in particular.  It is structured in three 
parts.  The first offers a mapping exercise of the relevant Treaty provisions - 
seeking to establish connections and ways of reading them so that they may 
"inform" each other. The second puts them in the context of the debate about 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) - a much used, but not undisputed 
international relations concept coined to express the nature of the EU's 
external policies and projection. 3 The third inquires further into the 
"normative" nature and effect of the EU's constitutional values and objectives.  
I will argue that the Treaty normative basis for the EU's external relations is 
meaningful and is to be taken seriously. 
 
 
Mapping the Treaties 
 
Reference was made above to Article 3(5) TEU, which sets out the EU's 
objectives "in its relations with the wider world".  The EU must, first of all, 
uphold and promote its values.  This of course raises the question as to what 
those values are, and how to define them.  Article 2 TEU attempts to sum 
them up: they are "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, 
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
belonging to minorities".  There is no immediate connection here to the values 
underpinning the internal market, or to services of general interest.  There is, 
however, a mediated one.  The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU 
Charter) contains a series of rights and principles grouped together in a title 
                                                            
3 See the seminal article by I Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" 
(2002) 40 JCMS 235. 
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on "Solidarity" (Title IV), mostly concerned with social rights, but including 
Article 36 on "Access to services of general economic interest": 
 
 The Union recognises and respects access to services of general 
 economic interest as provided for in national laws and practices, in 
 accordance with the Treaties, in order to promote the social and 
 territorial cohesion of the Union. 
 
This provision is not of course formulated as a human or fundamental right, 
and the Charter, as is well known, operates a cumbersome distinction 
between "rights" and "principles". 4  That however cannot mean that Article 36 
is not part of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU.  The Charter unifies civil 
and political rights, on the one hand, and social and economic rights on the 
other. 5  Its identity is singular: a Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.  The distinction between rights and principles is relevant to 
determining the effects of specific Charter provisions; but it is next to 
unarguable that, for the purpose of understanding the concept of respect for 
human rights as a Treaty-determined value of the EU, not all Charter 
provisions are to be included.  It may further be noted that the Charter Title on 
Solidarity also refers to social security and social assistance (including 
housing assistance); to a right of access to health care; and to a high level of 
consumer protection. 6  The right to education in Article 14 Charter is also 
worth mentioning. 
 
There are further links between the Treaty provisions on values and 
objectives, and the promotion of services of general interest.  The Charter 
puts such services under the heading of "solidarity", and Article 2 TEU 
describes how the EU's "values are common to the Member States in a 
society in which ... solidarity" (amongst others) prevails.  Clearly, the principle 
of solidarity underpins the EU's concept of what Article 3 TEU describes as "a 
highly competitive social market economy", and justifies and explains the 
                                                            
4 Art 52(5) EU Charter.  See, for an excellent attempt to make sense of that distinction, the 
Opinion of Crúz Vilalón AG in Case C-176/12 Association de Médiation Sociale 
EU:C:2013:491, paragraphs 43-80. 
5 Cf D Anderson and C Murphy, "The Charter of Fundamental Rights" in A Biondi, P Eeckhout 
and S Ripley (eds), EU Law after Lisbon (OUP 2012) 155, 160. 
6 See Artt 34, 35 and 38 EU Charter. 
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specific place occupied by services of general interest.  The principle of 
solidarity is further expressly referred to as an objective of the EU’s external 
action, in particular in Article 21(1) TEU, which includes it among "the 
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, 
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world" and which need to guide the 
EU's action on the international scene. 
 
There is further Treaty confirmation that services of general economic interest 
form part of the EU's values: Article 14 TFEU expressly confirms this by 
speaking of "the place occupied by services of general economic interest in 
the shared values of the Union as well as their role in promoting social and 
territorial cohesion".  Protocol No 26 further elucidates what these shared 
values entail. 
 
As a last section of this mapping exercise one may point towards the Treaty 
provisions on the common commercial policy.  Both Articles 205 and 207(1) 
TFEU confirm that the common commercial policy must be conducted in the 
context of the principles and objectives of the EU’s external action.  Article 
207 TFEU fully extends this policy to trade in services, 7 and it is of course in 
the context of international negotiations on such trade that the EU may seek 
to carve out a special position for services of general interest - both in the EU 
and elsewhere.  This is not a consideration devoid of political and practical 
relevance in light of the sensitivity of international attempts at liberalizing trade 
in services in sectors such as water, energy and the like.  Another type of 
sensitivity has found expression in the decision-making provisions of Article 
207: by derogation from the standard qualified majority voting, unanimity 
governs negotiations in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, 
where they "risk prejudicing the Union's cultural and linguistic diversity"; and 
in the field of trade in social, education and health services, where they "risk 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and prejudicing 
the responsibility of Member States to deliver them". 
 
                                                            
7 See eg M Krajewski "The Reform of the Common Commercial Policy" in Biondi, Eeckhout 
and Ripley (n 5 above) 292, 300. 
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It may be useful to sum up the main findings of this mapping exercise: 
 
• in its external action the EU is subject to an obligation to uphold and 
promote its own values; 
• those values include respect for human rights in a society in which 
solidarity prevails; 
• the EU Charter lists access to services of general economic interest as 
a fundamental right, under the heading of solidarity; 
• the principle of solidarity must be promoted as one of the express goals 
of EU external action; 
• the EU's internal market is described as a highly competitive social 
market economic and services of general economic interest are part of 
it, occupying a place in the shared values of the EU; 
• EU exclusive competence extends to international trade in services, 
but the decision-making provisions recognize that the liberalization of 
certain services is sensitive; and the common commercial policy must 
respect the principles and objectives of EU external action. 
 
Taken together, these Treaty provisions confirm that services of general 
interest are part of the EU's values system.  Precisely what that means, in 
substantive terms, is beyond the scope of this paper, as it would require an 
analysis of its own.  It is clear though that, in its external action, the EU must 
take services of general interest into account.  That Treaty command can be 
seen as a requirement for the EU's external dealings (for example when 
negotiating the liberalization of trade in services) not unduly to interfere with 
how services of general interest are organized within the EU Member States.  
But it could also be seen as a duty to respect and protect such services 
elsewhere, in third countries. 
 
Further reflection is of course needed on the normative "thickness" of the 
Treaty command for the EU to respect and promote its values in its external 
action.  What does this normativity entail?  Can it be operationalized, or is it 
no more than a form of constitutionalized wishful thinking?  A small detour via 
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international relations theory may assist in this reflection. 
 
 
Normative Power Europe? 
 
Many legal scholars are generally critical of the attempt to constitutionalize the 
EU's values and objectives.  As Larik reports, the manifold codified objectives 
of the EU have been described as a “Christmas tree” (in particular by the 
British delegation to the Convention on the Future of Europe), or a 
“hodgepodge” (von Bogdandy); or, specifically in relation to external 
objectives, as "redolent of motherhood and apple pie" (Dashwood and others), 
or a wish list for a better world (Drescher). 8  Even if he does not at length 
address the EU's external objectives, de Witte also complains that there is too 
much constitutional law in the EU's foreign relations. 9 
 
These scholars either regard the constitutionalization of values and objectives 
as rather meaningless, because of their vagueness and level of abstraction; 10 
or as hopelessly idealistic for the cold world of foreign relations, thereby 
placing themselves in the realist camp of international relations commentators.  
De Witte's critique is of a different character: he worries about the level of 
entrenchment which the law of EU external relations suffers through the 
process of constitutionalization. 
 
On the other hand, Larik argues that the EU's tendency to provide for a 
constitutional casting of the EU's external objectives is by no means unique, 
in that there is a general trend towards what he calls a "dynamic 
                                                            
8 J Larik, "Entrenching Global Governance: The EU's Constitutional Objectives Caught 
Between a Sanguine World View and a Daunting Reality", in B Van Vooren, S Blockmans and 
J Wouters (eds), The EU's Role in Global Governance - The Legal Dimension (OUP 2013) 7, 
18. 
9 B de Witte, "Too Much Constitutional Law in the European Union's Foreign Relations?", in M 
Cremona and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign Relations Law - Constitutional Fundamentals 
(Hart Publishing 2008) 3. 
10 See also P Leino, "The Journey Towards All that is Good and Beautiful: Human Rights and 
'Common Values' as Guiding Principles of EU Foreign Relations Law", in Cremona and de 
Witte (n 9 above) 259, 265. 
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internationalization" in constitutional law. 11  Many States' constitutions, both 
in Europe and beyond, 12 are said to follow the same trend. 
 
It is however remarkable that the general scepticism among lawyers is not 
shared by an important strand in international relations scholarship on the EU.  
Ian Manners' article on Normative Power Europe (NPE) is clearly seminal, 
and was shortlisted by the Journal of Common Market Studies as one of the 5 
best papers of the 2002-2011 decade. 13  The article was published in the first 
half of 2002, at a time when the Convention on the Future of Europe was only 
beginning to meet, and had not even started to debate how to 
constitutionalize the EU's external action.  And yet much of what Manners 
said about NPE is reflected in the provisions of the Constitutional Treaty and 
of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 
It is not the purpose of this paper to offer a full analysis of the concept of NPE, 
and the debate pertaining to it among international relations scholars.  I 
should merely like to note the remarkable convergence between this concept 
and the process of constitutionalization of the EU's values and objectives, in 
the sphere of its external action.  This convergence can be illustrated with a 
brief aperçu of some of Manners's observations, analyses and concepts, as 
set out in his seminal article.  His main aim was to move away from the 
dichotomy between military and civilian power, as it had been applied to the 
EU's external policies.  He claimed that "by refocusing away from debate over 
either civilian or military power, it is possible to think of the ideational impact of 
the EU's international identity/role as representing normative power". 14  He 
argued that one of the problems with the notions of civilian and military power 
was "their unhealthy concentration on how much like a state the EU looks" 
and considered that they "need to be augmented with a focus on normative 
power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a 
                                                            
11 J Larik, Shaping the international order as a Union objective and the dynamic 
internationalization of constitutional law, CLEER Working Papers 2011/5, 9 ff. 
12 Larik (n 8 above) 12-14. 
13 I Manners, "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" (2002) 40 JCMS 235.  
On the nomination, see the journal's website at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-5965. 
14 Ibid at 238. 
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willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions". 15  The EU's normative 
difference was argued to come from its historical context, hybrid polity and 
political-legal constitution. 16  Its constitutional norms were said to represent 
crucial constitutive factors determining its international identity, and the three 
above factors "accelerated a commitment to placing universal norms and 
principles at the centre of its relations with its Member States ... and the 
world ... ." Manners argued that "we cannot overlook the extent to which the 
EU is normatively different to other polities with its commitment to individual 
rights and principles in accordance with the ECHR and the UN". 17  He 
rejected the assumption that normative power requires a willingness to use 
force in an instrumental way, instead contending that "the central component 
of normative power Europe is that it exists as being different to pre-existing 
political forms, and that this particular difference pre-disposes it to act in a 
normative way". 18 
 
Again, all of this was written prior to the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty 
and the Treaty of Lisbon.  However, Manners's analysis was not confined to 
defining the concept of normative power in the rather abstract sense above.  
He digged deeper into the EU's normative foundations, identifying five "core" 
norms within the acquis communautaire and the acquis politique.  Those 
norms, he argued, were (1) the centrality of peace; (2) the idea of liberty; (3) 
democracy; (4) the rule of law; and (5) respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.  He further suggested four "minor" norms, but 
admitted that they were much more contested.  Those norms were (1) social 
solidarity, (2) anti-discrimination, (3) sustainable development and (4) good 
governance. 19 
 
The convergence between this normative basis and the current TEU 
provisions setting out the EU's values and objectives is striking.  Of course, 
Manners did not pick these core and minor norms out of thin air; except for 
                                                            
15 Ibid at 239. 
16 Ibid at 240. 
17 Ibid at 241. 
18 Ibid at 242. 
19 Ibid at 242-243. 
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the centrality of peace, the core norms were all referred to in Article 6 TEU, 
post Nice.  However, the Lisbon Treaty has clearly built on the NPE concept, 
and its provisions are arguably closer to Manners's concept and normative 
basis analysis than previous Treaty versions.  The point is not to show that 
the Treaty drafters embraced the NPE concept - though to some extent there 
may have been some influence. 20  Nor is it to argue that NPE is undisputed, 
21 or that Manners' seminal article has exhausted the reflection on NPE.  
However, what the NPE literature does show is that the constitutionalization of 
the EU's values and objectives corresponds to conceptions widely held in 
international relations scholarship about the specificity of the EU's 
international identity.  From this perspective, the Treaty catalogue of values 
and objectives cannot so easily be discarded as unrealistic, idealist, 
unspecified and vague; or as simply comparable to national constitutions, or 
constituting excessive constitutionalization.  It is worth quoting one of 
Manners's final paragraphs: 22 
 
 The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only 
 is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this 
 predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics.  It is built on 
 the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important 
 factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or 
 what it says, but what it is.  Thus my presentation of the EU as a 
 normative power has an ontological quality to it - that the EU can be 
 conceptualized as a changer of norms in the international system; a 
 positivist quantity to it - that the EU acts to change norms in the 
 international system; and a normative quality to it - that the EU should 
 act to extend its norms into the international system. 
 
 
Further literature on NPE has shown, however, that the concept of normative 
power is not straightforward - at least not for international relations scholars.  
The debate is in large measure about the meaning of "normative". 23  One 
question is the extent to which “normative” stands for universal norms and 
principles.  Aggestam, for example, sees tension in EU foreign policy 
                                                            
20 Cf T Forsberg, "Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of an Ideal 
Type" (2011) 49 JCMS 1183, 1186, where he refers to the adoption of NPE in policy papers 
and public diplomacy. 
21 For an overview of the criticism, see ibid at 1187-1189. 
22 Manners (n 13 above) at 252. 
23 Forsberg (n 20 above). 
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discourse between universalist aspirations and attempts to shape the world in 
Europe’s image. 24  She prefers focusing on the extent to which the EU is an 
ethical power, because that puts greater emphasis on questions of agency. 25  
According to De Zutter, there is no need for a normative power to advocate 
and diffuse universal norms; normative power is an identity attributed to a 
political entity that diffuses its own norms in the international system. 26  
However, such a conception of normative power would extend it to other 
international actors (States) – an express aim of De Zutter’s analysis – and 
thereby dilute the idea that the EU is different.  Manners, by contrast, 
continues to focus on universal norms and on the extent to which the EU “acts 
in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way”. 27  De Wekker and Niemann argue 
that the emphasis placed on law is an indicator of normative power: “A true 
normative power would bind not only others but also itself to collective rules”. 
28  Again, however, it could be said that there are many other international 
actors which aim to exercise such normative power. 
 
It is in this reflection on normative power that legal doctrine and scholarship 
may be able to assist, as notions of normativity are at the heart of law and 
legal systems.  Put simply, the normativity of NPE could be regarded to be 
constitutionally normative, in the legal sense: the EU is required to act 
externally in accordance with its own constitutionally determined normative 
basis, i.e. its values and objectives.  In Manners’s terms, that idea would not 
answer the positive question – whether the EU acts as a normative power.  
But it is highly relevant to the ontological and normative questions – whether 
the EU is a normative power, and whether it ought to act as one.  Furthermore, 
legal doctrine and scholarship may also assist in further defining the concept 
of “normative” in NPE, and in identifying the relevant norms as well as 
reflecting about their universal or universalizable character.  It would for 
                                                            
24 L Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical power Europe?” (2008) 84 International Affairs 7. 
25 Ibid, 3. 
26 E De Zutter, “Normative power spotting: an ontological and methodological appraisal” 
(2010) 17 Journal of European Public Policy 1107. 
27 I Manners, “The normative ethics of the European Union” (2008) 84 International Affairs 45. 
28 T de Wekker and A Niemann, “EU relations with Moldova: normative power Europe in 
action?” European Foreign Policy Unit Working Paper No 2009/3, available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/EFPU/EFPUpdfs/EFPUworkingpa
per2009-3.pdf, 13. 
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example be useful to start building bridges between the NPE literature and the 
literature on constitutionalism, European and international. 
 
Much of this is beyond the scope of the present paper.  The following section 
offers some initial ideas about the normative character of the EU’s values and 
objectives. 
 
 
The nature and effect of the EU's values and objectives as norms for external 
action 
 
From a legal perspective, the analysis of the nature and effect of the EU's 
values and objectives naturally starts with some inquiry into their 
enforceability.  The focus of that inquiry immediately turns on the EU Court of 
Justice (CJEU): to what extent is it possible to enforce, judicially, respect for 
the EU’s fundamental norms in its external action.  This immediate focus on 
the CJEU is a near Pavlovian reflex for EU legal scholars, and ought to be 
questioned, or at least contextualized.   
 
To begin with, it is not obvious that litigation before the EU’s own court would 
constitute a meaningful form of enforceability of the EU’s values and 
objectives.  In particular as regards external action, it could be argued that 
genuine enforcement ought to be located at the international judicial level, 
because of the stronger guarantees of independence offered by an “external” 
judiciary.  However, there are few avenues at present for such external 
judicial control, though that may change once the EU joins the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
There may be further concerns as to the relevance of internal, CJEU judicial 
control.  There may well be a gap between the concept of enforceability, and 
its practical relevance.  It may be easy to show that, in principle, respect for 
the EU’s values and objectives is judicially enforceable; but whether such 
enforceability makes an empirically demonstrable contribution to such respect 
is another matter.  Questions may also arise as to the “thickness” of 
 12 
enforceability, and the potential for tension between the different values and 
objectives.  Is not their general character such that their enforceability may not 
be very meaningful for hard decisions and the daily practice of external action. 
 
But even with those questions and doubts in mind, the inquiry into judicial 
enforceability before the CJEU continues to be useful, for a number of 
reasons.  One of those is that the strong rule-of-law dimension of the EU is 
not just a lofty ideal which the Treaties uphold, but is a reality in day-to-day 
policy-making.  Disagreements between the institutions, or between the 
Member States and the institutions, or between private parties and the 
institutions or Member States, quickly assume a strong legal dimension, and 
are easily judicialized.  In the sphere of EU external relations law, many such 
disputes have a significant constitutional dimension: they may concern the 
division of competences between the EU and its Member States; 29 matters of 
legal basis determining the respective powers of the institutions; 30 the 
constraints imposed by the duty of cooperation between the EU institutions 
and the Member States; 31 or the protection of fundamental rights in the 
context of counter-terrorism policies. 32  The phenomenon of which de Witte 
complains - that there is too much constitutional EU external relations law 33 - 
is to some degree a function of this strong rule-of-law dimension, and 
therefore unavoidable.  That is not to say that all of the case law excels in 
terms of constitutional quality and rigour.  The critique that some of the 
judgments may be too complicated may well be justified.  But the blame of 
judicialization, also of EU external policies, cannot be laid at the door of the 
CJEU: it is a function of the detailed and prolific Treaties which the Member 
States have drafted; of the wide scope of EU external action, in particular of a 
normative kind (it is no accident that so-called smart sanctions constitute the 
core of the CFSP); and of the EU's strong rule-of-law dimension.  It may be 
added that the actual judgments of the CJEU are but the tip of the iceberg.  
                                                            
29 For a recent example, see Case C-414/11 Daiichi Sankyo EU:C:2013:520, regarding the 
scope of the extension of the common commercial policy to intellectual property. 
30 See eg Case C-130/10 EP v Council EU:C:2012:472, regarding the EP's involvement in 
counter-terrorist asset freezing measures. 
31 See eg Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) EU:C:2010:203. 
32 See eg Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, UK and 
Council v Kadi (Kadi II) EU:C:2013:518. 
33 de Witte (n 9 above). 
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Beneath the surface there is a panoply of legal opinions and advocacy 
nourished by the principles developed in the case law.  In this basic sense, of 
extensive judicialization, there is a strong normative dimension to EU external 
action. 
 
There is not much case law yet on the EU's values and objectives, in relation 
to external action - particulary in their Lisbon version, which for case law 
purposes is still quite young.  Even so, there are some episodes and 
instances which clearly exemplify the potential for such case law to develop, 
and to determine the meaning of those values and objectives, and of the 
obligation to respect and promote them.  Three of those episodes/instances 
are summarily recounted below.  Two of them concern the requirement to 
respect fundamental rights; the third concerns the mandate to respect 
international law. 
 
The first episode revolves around the EU's external human rights policy, more 
specifically the policy to include human-rights clauses in bilateral agreements 
which the EU concludes with third countries. 34  Those clauses were initially a 
response to difficulties which the (then) EC had with suspending development 
aid to ACP countries with regimes which grossly violated human rights, and 
with suspending the cooperation agreement with Yugoslavia at the time of 
conflict between the Yugoslav republics.  In the latter case, there was litigation 
before the Court of Justice: a German wine importer, Racke, challenged the 
suspension of the agreement in response to the actions of the then Serbian 
regime and the attendant re-introduction of customs duties.  The Court found 
in favour of the Council, which had suspended the agreement invoking the 
rather precarious rebus sic stantibus doctrine of customary international treaty 
law. 35  Despite this successful defence the institutions acknowledged that 
there was a legal need to provide for the possible suspension of free trade, 
                                                            
34 See eg F Hoffmeister, Menschenrechts- und Demokratieklauseln in den vertraglichen 
Aussenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (Springer 1998); K Arts, Integrating 
Human Rights into Development Cooperationn: The Case of the Lomé Convention (Kluwer 
Law International 2000); E Fierro, The EU's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in 
Practice (Martinus Nijhoff 2003); L Bartels, Human Rights Conditionality in the EU's 
International Agreements (OUP 2005). 
35 Case C-162/96 Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz EU:C:1998:293. 
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cooperation and association agreements in cases of systemic violations of 
human rights.  This need strongly contributed to what became a core 
component of the EU's external human rights policy: the requirement to 
include so-called "essential elements" clauses in bilateral agreements 
requiring the parties to respect fundamental rights.  It is a policy which stands 
to this day, and which is not always convenient: witness the foundering of 
negotiations with Australia because of that country's refusal to accept such a 
clause. 36  It is further clear that the policy is not just a response to the legal 
difficulties which the Racke case revealed - the institutions deserve more than 
just defensive credit, and the European Parliament in particular has always 
been a strong advocate for a meaningful external human rights policy.  But it 
is equally obvious that the case law has assisted in crystallising the issues 
and has made a meaningful contribution. 
 
The second episode is well known, and has given rise to an enormous 
amount of debate: the Kadi saga, which concerns the EU implementation of 
UN counter-terrorism policies and the requirement for the EU institutions to 
respect the fundamental rights of those suspected of supporting terrorism.  
The saga has now come to an end with the de-listing of Mr Kadi, a Saudi 
businessman, by the UN Security Council, and with the double victory he 
scored in the CJEU. 37  It is again an episode confirming the importance of the 
protection of fundamental rights in the EU's external action.  Even in the face 
of a binding UN Security Council Resolution, the EU institutions must ensure 
that the listed person's rights of defence, of effective judicial protection, and to 
property are respected.  It does not matter that the listed person is not a 
national of one of the Member States, and resides outside the EU: as a 
person subject to EU law by virtue of the freezing of his EU assets, Mr Kadi 
could claim the full protection of his EU law fundamental rights.   
 
This dimension of the Kadi litigation, which has received very little 
commentary, is particularly noteworthy for the NPE debate.  The protection of 
                                                            
36 Fierro (n 34 above) at 287-302. 
37 Joined Cases C-402 and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat (Kadi I) EU:C:2008:461; for an 
overview of some of the relevant literature on this judgment see S Poli and M Tzanou, "The 
Kadi Rulings: A Survey of the Literature" (2009) 28 YEL 533; Kadi II (n 28 above). 
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a person’s human rights does not stop at the EU border; nor is it reserved to 
EU citizens.  This approach, which is in consonance with the ECHR, builds a 
strong link between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and EU external 
action.  It is highly relevant to EU policies on economic and financial sanctions, 
which are not confined to counter-terrorism, and which are currently under 
constant and intense judicial scrutiny in Luxembourg.  But the link may be 
equally relevant to the EU’s treaty-making practice, as the debate leading to 
the European Parliament’s rejection of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) has shown. 38  It is worth noting that the Commission tried 
to defuse that debate by requesting an Opinion from the CJEU, pursuant to 
Art 218(11) TFEU, on the compatibility of ACTA with the EU system of 
fundamental rights protection. 39  The request was later withdrawn, in the face 
of the Parliament’s firm rejection, but nevertheless showed the potential for 
litigation on respect for human rights when the EU negotiates a trade 
agreement. 
 
It is true that the Kadi episode also exposes the potential for tension between 
the requirement to uphold the protection of fundamental rights and the 
objective of ensuring "the strict observance and the development of 
international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations 
Charter" (Article 3(5) TEU).  Clearly, the EU's values and objectives will not 
always coexist as harmoniously as one would like.  However, there is a 
reading of the Kadi saga which leaves room for some level of harmony.  The 
protection and promotion of human rights is a UN objective, as much as it is 
an EU objective. The judgment in Kadi I led to a remarkable improvement in 
the UN's review system for counterterrorism listings, through the creation of 
the office of the Ombudsperson.  This is NPE at work.  The EU judicial 
challenge to the UN Security Council's practices focused attention on 
improving them, and led to a much stronger normative focus.  It may further 
be noted that in its latest judgment the Court of Justice claims that judicial 
review of counterterrorism listings "is indispensable to ensure a fair balance 
                                                            
38 See D Matthews and P Zikovská, “The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA): Lessons for the European Union” (2013) 44 IIC 626. 
39 Opinion 1/12, see [2013] OJ C 123, p. 14. 
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between the maintenance of international peace and security and the 
protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the person concerned ..., 
those being shared values of the UN and the European Union". 40  The Court 
thus strongly contributes to an international projection of the EU as a value-
oriented actor, and advocates a similar conception for, and an allegiance with, 
the UN. 
 
The third instance concerns one of the first judicial applications of the new 
provision in Article 3(5) TEU - also relevant to the Kadi litigation - requiring the 
EU to promote the strict observance and the development of international law.  
In the litigation concerning the extension of the EU's emissions trading 
legislation to air transport (which, incidentally, can be seen as a tool to 
promote sustainable development, another objective of external action), the 
Court of Justice referred to Article 3(5) TEU in relation to the capacity of US 
airlines to rely on customary international law. 41  The airlines' challenge was 
unsuccessful, and the judgment was not the first in which the Court applied 
customary international law. 42  Those qualifications notwithstanding, it is 
definitely not excluded that the Court may display a greater willingness to hear 
international law arguments and become stricter in upholding the international 
rule of law, including against the EU's own institutions.  The indicia are limited 
at this point in time, though, and what is stated here constitutes more a 
personal prediction than an established tendency. 
 
These episodes/instances are exemplary rather than determinative.  Some 
tentative conclusions can be drawn from them, but a more structured analysis 
of the normative dimension of the EU's values and objectives requires further 
reflection.  It is nevertheless clear that the examples given are in line with the 
NPE concept.  They show the legal significance of these values and 
objectives, often at the detriment of effective, purely interest-based external 
policies.  It would be more straightforward to negotiate bilateral agreements if 
there was no need to include an essential elements clause.  The EU's 
                                                            
40 Kadi II, paragraph 131. 
41 Case C-366/10 Air Transport Association of America EU:C:2011:864. 
42 See also Racke (n 35 above). 
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counter-terrorism and other sanctions policies would be easier to implement if 
the EU institutions could simply hide behind the Security Council.  And the 
EU's legislative agenda is not inviting the constraint of international law. 
 
The episodes narrated here also exemplify the scope for judicial enforcement 
of the EU’s values and objectives, as well as indicating ways in which the 
case law of the CJEU may contribute to NPE by, for example, requiring 
respect for fundamental rights and for international law, and by instituting 
normative dialogue with other actors such as the UN Security Council. 
 
 
Some concluding remarks 
 
The argument that the EU is primarily a normative power predates the strong 
constitutionalization of the EU’s values and objectives through the Lisbon 
Treaty.  Nevertheless, that constitutionalization invites a further reflection 
about the normativity of these values and objectives.  The NPE literature is a 
useful backdrop for this reflection, which ought to conducted also by legal 
scholars, who should take those values and objectives more seriously than 
has so far been the case.  This paper has attempted to offer a first start, by 
focusing on normativity from a perspective of judicial enforceability.  The 
preliminary conclusion is that the EU’s values and objectives are meaningful 
to judicial discourse, and have some degree of enforceability. 
 
This paper has not focused much on services of general economic interest, in 
contrast with the remainder of this volume.  It is clear though that the EU’s 
conception of such services is embedded in its value system, as confirmed by 
the Treaties and by the Charter.  This means that the protection and, 
conceivably, the exportation of that conception need to be taken on board in 
the EU’s external action.  The identification of social solidarity as a norm 
which NPE embraces, confirms that finding. 
 
That raises further questions about the nature of the norms which ought to 
promote and diffuse in its external action.  Is the recognition and protection of 
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services of general economic interest a universal norm, or is it rather a typical, 
internal EU norm, which the EU seeks to export?  That question can also be 
raised with respect to other norms which form part of the EU’s fundamental 
values system.  But it is not clear whether the NPE concept requires absolute 
universality, as distinguishable from a concept of fundamental norms, and a 
fundamentally normative approach, focusing on Europe’s conception of the 
good life; norms lending themselves to universal application without 
constituting the emanation of a new form of imperialism. 
 
 
 
 
 
